Κώστας Β. Mποτόπουλος

“TA NEA” newspaper, April 7 2009

Following London’s G20 summit, the world heaved a sigh of relief - to such an extent that the reversion to old habits just two days later, at NATO’s 60th Summit in Strasbourg, went pretty much unnoticed. The predominant, most widely circulated impression left behind was that through the meeting of the 20 most powerful leaders, mankind seemed to grasp the severity of the financial crisis - but what about the social crisis? - and appeared ready to take action in an organized and collective way. The risk of not reaching an agreement - and thus damaging the international trust in the power of politics while delivering the last blow to global economy - was indeed avoided. But for how long will we settle for the lesser of two evils? Especially in face of such a crisis - deep; multiple; systemic - can salvation equate with the simply obvious? In other words, might we have rushed to celebrate?

Let us try to weigh things without being overtly sentimental or dramatic. There are three, I reckon, major questions. Does the resolution that was drawn up during the London Summit have the dynamic not only to block but also to reverse the way to disaster? Does the states’ as well as the leaders’ political willpower to carry on marching together and in accord with common principles shine - faintly at least - behind the technical details of the afore-mentioned resolution? And above all, is there a plan to shift the political, financial and psychological paradigm, so that this new era everyone considers essential - at least in theory - can originate through the crisis? My first impression is that “London’s answers” are vaguer and less bold than required (since priority was given once again to money injections through the bankrupt system’s own organizations such as the International Monetary Fund to the detriment of “global governance”-type solutions). Big countries, undeterred by the apparent changes in USA’s stance under the leadership of Barack Obama, but also, most unfortunately, the European Union member states appear unable to break loose from nationalistic reflexes and form a notion of “global emergency” (cases in point: the chicken-fights over which countries will be included in the list of “tax havens” - as if their listing was the problem and not their operation - as well as the adherence to national, and hence incompatible, policies of supporting the system’s weak links). Lastly, what seems to emerge is the survival of the currently prevailing model (none dared talk about “other markets”, different commercial transactions and another type of working conditions) rather than the “vision” (I now always put this word in quotes) of a new relation between politics, economy and social demands. The tacit choice of a Right-wing way-out, at a time when everyone acknowledges the superiority of the social-democratic mixture and agrees that the excessive deviation from this model was exactly what led us to the current situation, strikes me as particularly bizarre.