Κώστας Β. Mποτόπουλος

Rocard does not write to induce but to initiate - at the risk though of courting exaggeration (“a nation of continuous heroism”; Oliver Stone who “overdramatised” when writing “Midnight Express”; Turkey having a “glorified tradition of conquering but also of respecting the conquered”; a glutted admiration for Atatürk, Erdoğan, Derviş, even for the largely unknown magnate-heiress Güler Sabancı). Logically, he devotes most of his pages to an - unbiased and convincing, at least the way I see it - analysis of the arguments in favour of Turkey’s accession to the EU: adhering to the promise made to Turkey back in 1963; avoiding a discretionary behaviour of the Union towards Ankara; acknowledging its importance for forming a multicultural, non-purely Christian European identity; benefitting in political, financial, commercial and energy terms from such a “marriage” (“let us be egoists, this is a gargantuan market”); taking the carrot-and-stick approach to peacefully modernising Turkey. Much to his credit - otherwise, he would not be Rocard - the author does not burke the problems and the obstacles lying ahead: the flaws in the rule of law (even though he considers, rather too optimistically, that the Constitutional Court’s recent decision not to ban the ruling AKP party shows that “the rule of law is starting to prevail”); the problems with minorities (especially the Kurds); the - not only financial - inequalities between the country’s regions; the delay in proceeding with agrarian modernisation; the existence of an “economy of crime” (with 300.000 children aged under 15 working illegally and inhumanely). Naturally, he tackles the subject of Cyprus albeit, in my opinion, in an extremely one-sided way: he talks of a mere “conundrum” (compared with the Kurdish “carcinoma” and the Armenian “taboo”); he reckons Turkey “made a big mistake” in 1974 but Greece “had left it no other choice” (isn’t this the Turkish, but only Turkish, theory behind the invasion?); he holds the view that since Greek Cypriots voted “no” in the Annan Plan referendum, Turkey has every right to avoid its customs obligations towards Cyprus.

Moreover, there are issues the author does not raise in his ardent essay, such as the contradictions inherent in Kemalism (a system which safeguards the Turkish state’s secular character but is not always consistent with the rules of democracy), Greece’s role in “reviving” the Turkish nomination process through Helsinki and its unwavering position in support of the accession since then, the economic growth which to a large extent has been achieved not contrarily to but due to the Turkish economy’s surviving feudalistic elements (such as “corporate family dynasties”). Furthermore, he does not seem conscious of the obvious downside to one of his own arguments in favour of Turkey’s accession: the size of that country has not only the potential to enhance the “European Model” but is also a threat to that model. Lastly, I do not find convincing the connection made between “the end of the European federal dream” (attributed to United Kingdom’s entry) and the view that, exactly because Europe is no longer political, it can accept Turkey into its bosom. As I see it, the battle for a deeply political, even if non-federal, Europe still can and still should be fought. With or without Turkey. But that’s another, and also exceptionally interesting, story. I hope, now that he has retired from politics, the thought provoking machine called Michel Rocard will have more free time for exchange of views. I am still trying to get hold of him.