Institutional repercussions of EU crisis plansBy
Dr. Costas Botopoulos
Professor of Constitutional Law, President of the Greek Capital Markets Commission
The “Greek problem” proved to be the catalyst for an extended institutional exercise at EU level: what we commonly call the “Lisbon Treaty” (which is, in legal fact, two plus one juxtaposed and not always coordinated texts: the Treaty on the European Union -TEU, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union –TFEU, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights) , although born during the eruption of the pan-European crisis, did not adequately provide for action in real crisis situations; such actions and measures were not only envisaged but rendered necessary when the Greek crisis grew out of proportion, in the beginning of 2010; in order to cope with the asymmetry (scant provisions, urgent need of action) the EU leaders and the EU organs thought out and put into effect a series of “support mechanisms”; such mechanisms did not frontally collide with but led to imaginative re-interpretation of the existing institutional framework. The goal of the present article is to show the parallel progress of the solution-making and of the Treaty-changing-without-amending process.
Ideological and social domination in the crisis years
Let us open up the image a little bit. Plunged as we are -not unfairly- into the difficulties of our homeland, we Greeks have let ourselves, once more, to miss far-reaching developments. While the two major political events of the last three years, i.e. the global financial crisis and the Obama election, have -in terms of ideology- vindicated ideas of the Democratic Left, in terms of relating social forces with election results they achieved the strengthening of right-wing parties. What really happened and the social democratic logic and soft power did not prevail and therefore the countries of the world, one after the other, bow to the sirens of populism, nationalistic entrenchment and the enforcement of trends and ideas which at other times would, without any hesitation, have been called extreme-Right?
I attribute particular importance to three reflective consequences of the crisis that combine psychological and political elements. The crisis might have been -on paper- a slap in the face of neo-liberalism, but also created the incubation conditions of a new Right rather than for some new expression of the Left: It filled citizens with insecurity and fear, shrunk up to disappearance the public space, reinforced the importance of small circles (homeland, family, individual) against the importance of great ideals (international solidarity, justice, equality). “Conservatism” moved from the area of ideology to the field of survival and thus its weakness was transformed into force. The Right realized this in time and effectively: on the one hand by appropriating achievements and ideas vindicated by history (from Sarkozy-type declarations on “humanization of capitalism” to promoting measures of clearly social democratic origin, such as "Economic governance’', Eurobonds, supernational authorities to control the financial system, even taxation on stock-exchange transactions) and on the other hand by hardening its attitude towards the two social issues which matter the most to its voters (security and immigration). By accepting this bilateral and hypocritically consensual positioning societies have allowed the third and greatest paradox: the abandonment of pretexts and the emergence of a "Right beyond limits'’.
Comment on a collective political essay
One doesn’t need to be a historian to observe how fast and out of control the new century evolves. If Eric Hobsbawm, the greatest historian of the age, has called the 20th century ‘’short’’, I think he wouldn’t deny us the right to already characterize the 21st century as ‘’dense’’. A recent Greek book, collection of unequal in quantity and quality articles, extending its scientific field from political science to economy via diplomatic relations, constitutes a nice illustration. This word is not accidental, as what’s interesting in this volume titled ‘’From Bush to Obama”, edited by the indefatigable Sotiris Dalis, lies mainly in its panoramic view, thus justifying the subtitle ‘’ International politics in a changing world’’.
‘’Multi-polarity’’ and ‘’turmoil’’, are, I believe, the two key-words of both the era and the book. It is also noticed by the unforgettable Viron Theodoropoulos in his short but concise prologue: perhaps never again in history have there simultaneously existed (at least with such perception from global conscience) so many issues (a fact which also provides a possible side-explanation of the retreat of politics), so many “players” (individuals and countries), so many reversals of relations and situations, such great mobility (speed, but not necessarily movement).
presentation by Dr. Kostas Botopoulos, former MEP, member of the PASOK directorate
Invited, along with Prof. Christoforos Sardelis, at the wonderful house of the Swedish ambassador Hakan Malmqvist, I talked to the members of the Hellenic-Swedish Chamber of Commerce and to business executives about the recent developments in
a. Greek governance has been so bad the last few years that it cannot but change for the better. I brought up as examples the tripling of the debt and the doubling of the non-development state expenditure during 2007-2009; the conversely proportional performances of our country in the areas of corruption and competitiveness as well as the unjustifiably high number of convictions of Greece by the European Court of Justice (22 only in 2009) which have cost us another 6 million euros in fines.
I first met Michel Rocard back in 1990, when he was France’s Prime Minister (Mitterrand’s principally) and I was a Sorbonne student (a Paris student principally). He had invited a group of young Socialists to the Hôtel Matignon and, once we got acquainted with each other, he asked me not about Andreas Papandreou, who was struggling to recover from the election defeat of 1989, but about Costas Simitis, who still had not made his first move towards power. Was he a visionary or just exceptionally clear-sighted? The exact same thought crossed my mind when I re-met him, as a colleague this time, in the European Parliament and particularly after reading the last work he published before stepping down (after three tenures as MEP and sixty years in active politics). The book in question has the downright eloquent title: “Yes to Turkey” and embodies all the basic qualities of its author: analytical sang-froid and lucidity; convictions that go against the current; unreserved commitment; perfectly clear goals (Turkey entering the European Union in 2023). It remains to be seen whether Rocard will be vindicated, once again and as always ex post.
“TA NEA” newspaper, March 10 2009
A ghost is roaming about Europe. And it is not, my dear vanquished Karl, the ghost of Communism. Today’s menace is called dissolution - and it is psychological and social rather than institutional and financial; the breaking of the Union into two - or even more- subgroups and most of all, the fragmentation, that is to say the death, of the European political plan. The danger in question rose violently to surface due to the crisis but is not a child of the crisis. The root cause should, in my opinion, be traced to the continuous sacrifice of politics on the altar of an economic affluence with feet of clay.
I count myself among those who still reckon that the 2004 enlargement of the European Union was politically necessary and that the post-Soviet states instilled diversity and power into Europe. It would be hypocritical, though, not to acknowledge the fact that these states not only upset the overall European balance (a prospect which was to a large extent predictable) but also tipped it to the detriment of unity. For this twist, the responsibility is shared. “The old guard”, the core of the Union, received the new members without first setting the required conditions for integration. The Europe to which they were looking forward and into which they were integrated had neither the strength to enforce its paradigm nor the tools to shape collective conscience. And when the crisis emerged, which of course weighed heavily on the countries with more vulnerable and less adapted economies, the messages sent by the Union’s strong were not actually in concrete solidarity with their Eastern “relatives”. From the imperial French presidency, the weak Chech presidency’s equally imperial redoubling by Sarkozy and the late discovery of protectionism for French products, to the German rejection of joint solutions and (Eurobond-type) tools defending the weak, Italy’s identification - and targeting - of Romanians with Roma and Britain’s “usage” of the Eastern countries only as a lever to promote a pro-NATO approach, the examples of arrogance and of inability to come to terms with the new reality are very ample.
Then again, the former Eastern Bloc countries interpreted their accession to the EU in a rather passive and selfish way. Let us ponder - and may they ponder too - over their rather inconsiderate pro-Atlantism and pro-Americanism as well as their explicitly atavistic anti-Russianism; over the disastrous “Kaczyński experience” as well as the Polish prime minister’s recent remarks against a European “return to Socialism”; over the Czech president’s -and also at the moment European President’ s- provocations against all European institutions; over the plans to “resurrect” the technologically outdated nuclear factories in Slovakia and Bulgaria, plans laid out as soon as the recent energy dispute broke out; over Romania’s plunge into economic scandals and corruption; over Bulgaria’s flawed Rule of Law; over Slovenia’s belated objection to the prospective accession of Croatia. And when the crisis came knocking at their doors, these countries chose to intimidate - swagger, no more no less - rather than find an explanation, to evoke past ghosts (the new “Iron Curtain”) instead of fresh ideas. Furthermore, they gave priority to a shortsighted economic perspective over politics and ethics, while drawing arguments from their weaknesses instead of the power emanating from their new European position.
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